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Summary  
 Thailand has experienced the political instability with several changes of the political 
system from election, coup, and revolution since its first democratic regime in 1932. What 
interesting is the fact that the Bank of Thailand (BOT), as one of the government organization, 
could persistently design and implement its financial institution policy as it intended. To shed 
new light of the existing literature, this study aims to answer the question: Why could the 
Bank of Thailand maintain governing capacity despite political instability?  To answer why 
the BOT could have governing capacity in an unstable politics, the embedded autonomy of 
the BOT within the private sector is the core of this study. Before 2008, the qualifications 
and characters of the governors, shaped by their background, is a crucial factor to determine 
the governing capacity of the BOT. This is because the power of the BOT was concentrated 
at the governor under the Bank of Thailand Act of 1942 and its amendments. After the 
promulgation of the Bank of Thailand Act of 2008, the reliance on the governor is lessen due 
to the design of the institution, which allows the separation of power within the bank. 
Considering the financial institution policy-making process and implementation, the 
banking sector governance can be divided into three phrases. The first phrase is between 
1942-1971 when the BOT relatively isolated from the private financial institutions. All of the 
2 
 
governors had very limited linkage with the private financial institutions. While the BOT 
failed to cultivate the relationship with the private financial institutions, the power of the 
private financial institutions, especially the commercial banks, had continued to grow to the 
level that the BOT could not exercise its governing capacity. In this period, the Thai Bankers’ 
Association (TBA), which was the collusion of the banks, had played the vital role.  
The second phrase starts from 1972 to 1997. This is the period when the rent-seeking 
behavior of the private financial institutions is clearly seen. The big banks enjoyed their 
monopoly power. The self-interested incumbent of the bankers had obstructed the BOT to 
design and implement the financial institution policy as it intended. The result of failure to 
govern the private financial institutions, in combination with internal struggle of the BOT, is 
the emergence of the financial crisis in 1997.  
The third phrase is after the Asian financial crisis. The financial crisis was an 
important shift of balance of power between the TBA and the BOT. The BOT could learn to 
exercise the power from that point on and the new governor with the private sector 
background could help accelerate the BOT to achieve the governing capacity through 
embedded autonomy. The embedded autonomy of the BOT is clearly seen when Pridiyathorn 
had been appointed as the governor in 2001. There are more channels that the private 
financial institutions could involve in the policy-making process. Comparing to the period 
before 1997, the relationship between the BOT and the private financial institutions after the 
financial crisis is based more on cooperation and consultation rather than exchanging for own 
benefit. The embedded autonomy has strengthened the governing capacity of the BOT, which 
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has implication for financial outcome. Furthermore, we also see the policy continuity of the 
BOT despite the political instability and the change of governors.  
 
